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*
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
As a matter of full disclosure, I should reveal that in 2006–07 I served as Counselor on
International Law to the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and thus
participated in the implementation of some of the policies that candidate Obama
attacked in 2008. None of the views expressed here, however, should be attributed to
the government of the United States, the State Department, or indeed any person,
legal or physical, other than myself. In addition, as discussed in the body of the article,
I filed an amicus brief on behalf of European Parliamentarians in People’s Mojahedin
Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Again, the views expressed
herein are mine alone, and not those of any of my clients in that matter. Finally, after
finishing the first draft of this essay, I had the opportunity to review the manuscript of
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11 (forthcoming 2012). There is considerable overlap in our observations and
analysis, although Professor Goldsmith’s are much more fully developed and rest on a
deeper engagement with government office than are my own. This Essay benefited
from comments by Goldsmith, but responsibility for all errors is mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
As a candidate for president, Barack Obama made
“change” a central theme of his campaign. In particular, he
railed against the Bush administration’s human rights policy,
including its resort to a war of choice that resulted in many
civilian casualties, its detention of suspected terrorists at
Guantanamo, its use of military tribunals instead of civilian
courts to punish persons accused of terrorism, its expansive
sense of what constitutes war crimes and who can be punished
for committing them, and its general hostility to human rights
litigants.1 Three years into the Obama administration, we find
the nation recently embroiled in a new war of choice in Libya as
well as an expanded conflict in Afghanistan, while only at the
beginning of a fraught extraction from Iraq. Guantanamo
remains in business, military tribunals once again have become
the preferred option for punishing foreign terrorist ringleaders
whom our government cannot kill outright, the law of war
remains the dominant model for framing the legal limits of US
projections of force overseas, and courts have continued to
narrow the scope of human rights litigation without serious
resistance from the executive. At a glance, it appears that
President Obama has become the person that candidate Obama
ran against.
All of this is familiar. This Essay’s response is limited, but
perhaps helpful. It does not consider whether the Bush or
Obama administration responded better to the challenges posed
by terrorist threats in light of our human rights values and
commitments. This Essay does not excoriate the current
administration for its human rights failures or defend it for its
pragmatism. In 2008 it was not reasonable to expect candidate
Obama, once elected, to reverse, or even change significantly,
the course taken by the US government to meet terrorist threats
or otherwise to address human rights issues. An expectation of
continuity has largely been realized. This Essay will explore the
institutional dynamics that brought about this result. Its
objective, in other words, is positive, not normative. It explains
1. See Barack Obama, Democratic Presidential Candidate, Speech on Iraq (Mar.
19, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2008/obamas-speech-iraq-march2008/p15761.
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why administrations behave the way they do and does not guide
them to some other path than the one they have taken.
The institutional constraints that limit what actions a
serving US president can take to advance human rights include:
(1) the challenge to win re-election; (2) the policies and
practices developed by career civil servants and military
personnel; (3) the profound difficulty of the issues and the risks
presented by all conceivable choices, due to the dynamic and
uncertain environment surrounding and forming the modern
national security presidency; and (4) the distinct and opposing
interests of Congress and the judiciary. This Essay discusses how
each limits the ability of a new administration to break with the
past. This Essay then analyzes a particular human rights dispute
in which I have done some work, and where the Obama
administration has taken exactly the same approach as did the
Bush administration.
I. THE SHADOW OF THE NEXT ELECTION
From the moment he takes office, a first-term president
works in the shadow of the next election. Hypothetically, the
president might hold the view that elections turn on factors
largely outside his control and that he should concentrate on
serving as effectively as possible to achieve the policies he
prefers. At least in my lifetime (since 1950), no president has
behaved this way. Rather, the president acts as if immediate and
early impressions have lasting effects, and that shaping popular
impressions of his conduct matters more than the objective
impact of his work on people who will vote. During this period,
seven presidents, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, G.H.W.
Bush, Clinton, and G.W. Bush, have run for reelection, five
successfully. The sample is too small to prove anything, but it
suggests that focusing on reelection rather than policy has some
positive impact on the desired outcome.2

2. Excluded from this list are incumbents who attained the presidency other than
by election (Johnson and Ford). Johnson in 1964 and Ford in 1976 sought election, not
reelection. If one were to treat a decision not to run for reelection as equivalent to a
defeat (Truman in 1952, Johnson in 1968), then the point in text becomes much
weaker (only five victories out of nine chances).
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The impact of the shadow of the next election on national
security decision making is exceptionally tricky. Conventional
wisdom is that, ceteris paribus, domestic factors, in particular
economic conditions, matter more than national security
matters in determining the outcome of an election. G.H.W.
Bush lost the 1992 election in spite of a surprisingly easy military
triumph and general foreign policy success because the
economy had weakened; Carter managed to combine both bad
economic conditions and the public humiliation of the Iranian
hostage crisis. But presidents still seem to act as if national
security policy has significant electoral consequences. They
appear to believe that, in the popular mind, the chain of
causation between presidential actions and foreign interactions
is clearer and more direct than that involving the domestic
economy. The death of Americans, whether in combat or as
victims of attacks by outsiders, also has high salience. The two
presidents since World War II who did not seek reelection,
Truman in 1952 and Johnson in 1968, both presided over costly
wars that, as the election approached, seemed not to have
achieved sufficient strategic, economic, or ideological benefits.
A president, therefore, is highly allergic to choices that
increase the likelihood that he will be blamed for the death of a
substantial number of Americans, especially if the victims
include civilians. This does not mean that civilian deaths, by
themselves, translate into presidential political damage. G.W.
Bush managed to persuade a majority of voters, if not
documentary film directors or law professors, that the 9/11
attack was a surprise for which he should not be held
accountable and to which he made an appropriately forceful
response. But if a terrorist attack on the United States no longer
can be depicted as a surprise, then the president must worry that
any decision he makes that in hindsight may be portrayed as
reducing vigilance will come back to haunt him.
This does not mean that a president has no corresponding
political costs from association with serious human rights abuses.
But a strong commitment to human rights as a foundational
element of foreign policy did not save Carter in 1980, and the
publication of the Abu Ghraib photographs in the spring of
2004 did not sink G.W. Bush’s reelection, any more than the
nonintervention in the Rwanda genocide hurt Clinton in 1996.
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Perhaps the public is more willing to accept the excuse that
rogue subordinates, and not bad supervisors, are responsible for
the abuse, or perhaps they do not care all that much about
foreign victims. The point is only that the shadow of the next
election appears to push a president confronted with tradeoffs
more in the direction of countering national security threats
and less in the direction of honoring human rights values.
Using this lens, the choices made by the Obama
administration seem more understandable. Moving from an
armed conflict model to a criminal justice model to manage
terrorist threats, however appealing from a human rights
perspective, increases the possibility of false negatives (failure to
identify terrorist threats), even as it suppresses false positives
(harassment and punishment of people who pose no serious
threat). This change in risks would bother any administration
mindful of the next election.
II. THE PERMANENT BUREAUCRACY
Compared to, say, Israel or the United Kingdom, political
appointees go down fairly deep into a US administration.3 In the
United States, the heads of cabinet departments, the deputy
heads, the divisional heads (assistant secretaries), and in many
cases the principal deputies to divisional heads are political
appointees rather than career civil servants. In some other
countries only the cabinet head and his or her special assistants
will change with the election of a new government. Even so, US
political appointees are vastly outnumbered by their civil service
colleagues and subordinates. Moreover, in the Department of
Defense and the various intelligence agencies, political
penetration tends to be even thinner.4 Finally, for the first year
3. Compare S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH
CONG., POLICY & SUPPORTING POSITIONS 36 (Comm. Print 2008) (enumerating over
7000 federal civil service positions that may be filled by presidential appointment), with
CABINET OFFICE, LIST OF MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDING EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES AND NON-MINISTERIAL DEPARTMENTS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/lmr110311.pdf (listing
ministers appointed by the British Prime Minister), and ROTEM BRESLER-GONEN,
POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS IN ISRAELI LOCAL GOVERNMENT 8–10 (2007) (describing the
political appointment process and listing a number of appointees in Israel).
4. See CHERYL Y. MARCUM ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS: POSITIONS AND PROCESS xi (2001) (noting that
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of a new administration, if not longer, many political appointees
await Senate confirmation, blunting their ability to command
and lead their agencies. Much of the burden of policy
development and implementation thus falls to the permanent
staff of the relevant agencies.
This bureaucratic check has at least two consequences.
First, the career staff look to precedent for guidance and thus
resist change. They understand that they, more likely than their
political masters, will still be in government when the mediumrange future arrives. They look to the past and lessons learned as
more reliable sources of sound practice than the aspirations of
the immediate leaders of the agency.
Second, career staff tend to defend the interests of the
agency rather than of the administration as a whole. They tend
to believe that policies come and go but that agencies endure.
This attitude, captured so exquisitely in the pronouncement
ascribed to the then head of the Strategic Air Command
General Curtis E. LeMay—“the Soviet Union is our adversary.
Our enemy is the Navy”—produces interagency conflicts that
retard government action and wear down policy enthusiasts.5
The permanent bureaucracy can obstruct policy changes in
many ways. First, career employees have considerable control
over the flow of information that reaches political appointees.
Second, they have principal responsibility for implementing,
and thus shaping, whatever policy emerges. Most obviously, they
can generate bureaucratic inertia. Third, they can embarrass
and intimidate their political masters by leaking to the press.
Moreover, none of these powers requires actual exercise: the
threat of taking any of these steps deters political appointees
from pushing too hard for change.
National security concerns tend to amplify the
bureaucracy’s resistance to change. Information is critical to
developing any kind of threat assessment. Obstruction is hard to
distinguish from watchful waiting. And press disclosure has a
disproportionate impact on policies that depend on secrecy for
their effectiveness. We should expect, then, that policies
only forty-five individuals in the Department of Defense are appointed by the president
subject to Senate confirmation).
5. See, e.g., George F. Will, Editorial, Greenhorns of the Year, WASH. POST, Nov. 23,
1995, at A23.
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motivated by national security concerns will change more slowly
than other approaches when a new administration comes to
Washington.
These factors illuminate why so little has changed in the
Obama administration. The approaches to terrorist threats and
human rights worked out during the Bush administration
changed significantly between 2002 and 2006 in the face of
bureaucratic resistance, as well as judicial setbacks and legislative
interventions. Whatever their flaws, by 2008 these practices had
become those of the bureaucracy, of the defense and
intelligence agencies in particular. They preferred the devil they
knew—in particular, but not only, the internationally decried
detention facility in Guantanamo—to the unknown alternatives.
And their preferred outcome prevailed.
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF THE ISSUES
One explanation for the Obama administration's
conservative approach to the national security-human rights
tradeoff is the difficulty of demonstrating that any alternative is
clearly superior. All choices are bad, because of the high
likelihood of both false positives, (i.e., the abuse of innocents)
and false negatives (i.e., the failure to detect a threat). The
evidence of how any particular choice works is scant. As a result,
once the government has settled on one approach, however
random the process that produced it, officials face great
difficulty in supporting other strategies.
Several factors explain this. First, adversaries exploit
trickery and deception. Second, any single attack is a lowprobability event. As a result, proponents of change necessarily
will have little evidence to support their ideas. Any conceivable
policy will rest mostly on surmise and guesswork.
This radical indeterminacy, coupled with highly salient but
low probability outcomes, is not typical of all governance. In
some fields—tax comes to mind—the application of policy
involves millions of iterations. The multiplicity of applications
allows for some averaging out of random errors and also
presents opportunities for learning by doing. The contrast with
national security policy is striking. The successful detection of a
terrorist threat, as well as failures to detect, occurs rarely. This
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means both that the government has a much smaller margin of
error and few means of testing the validity of policy choices.
One might respond that values-based arguments do not
depend on evidence. Certain core human rights commitments,
for example a refusal to condone torture, might set boundaries
on policies for reasons that do not depend on instrumental,
cost-benefit arguments. But, such principled positions still need
to be translated into concrete practice.
By torture, does one mean the core practices covered in the
Convention Against Torture?6 What about cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment, which Article 16 of that Convention
separately regulates?7 What about the US constitutional test of
behavior that “shocks the conscience”? What conduct fits into
which category? Does waterboarding, a widely used training
technique for military personnel at risk of enemy capture, fit
one or more of these definitions when it is wielded against an
adversary? Simple invocation of a commitment not to condone
torture answers none of these questions.
At some point in the analysis, cost-benefit calculations must
enter the picture with the inevitable difficulties of marshaling
and assessing evidence. Suppose one has credible evidence, not
obtained through torture, that a prisoner knows of plans to
carry out a mass attack. How willing would a responsible
decisionmaker be to allow aggressive interrogation of the sort
that could never produce evidence admissible in judicial
proceedings? By what criteria would one test the utility of such
procedures, if used infrequently and in fraught contexts?
In asking these questions, this Essay does not take a stand
on any of the claims and counterclaims about the role of
waterboarding in producing information that thwarted planned
Al Qaeda attacks. Nor does it assess the accuracy of the charge
that the Obama administration, which unequivocally expressed
its intolerance of waterboarding within months of taking office,
used intelligence derived from waterboarding in its successful

6. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(1988).
7. Id. art. 16.
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attack on Osama Bin Laden.8 Again, the argument is positive,
not normative: the low-frequency, high-risk context of the
national security-human rights tradeoff makes it easy to grab
handy tools and difficult to put them down in favor of
something better.
The waterboarding episode, deplorable though it may be,
seems to illustrate this point. Both “torture” and “condone” are
plastic concepts that shrink or swell in response to context.
When terrorist threats are involved, the context is necessarily
dynamic, uncertain, and greatly consequential.
IV. CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY CONGRESS AND THE
JUDICIARY
The principles of separation of powers, coupled with the
constitutional scheme of checks and balances, significantly
constrain any administration’s ability to make and implement
new policy. One can see this at work in the G.W. Bush
administration, where successive US Supreme Court decisions
rejected
the
structural
arguments
underlying
his
administration's approach to the detention and punishment of
suspected terrorists.9 The government argued that the judiciary
should play no role in supervising the process of capturing,
detaining, and punishing alien enemy combatants encountered
and held overseas.10 The government maintained that
legislatively enacted authority to engage in military hostilities
immunized the overseas detention of foreign nationals captured
in those hostilities from judicial oversight.11 In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court demanded that the executive go to
Congress to get clearer authority for its detention practices.12 In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court rejected the executive's

8. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Osama Bin Laden Death Reignites Battle over Waterboarding,
‘Enhanced Interrogation,’ ABC NEWS (May 3, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/osama-binladen-dead-renews-debate-waterboarding-interrogation/story?id=13518686.
9. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
10. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 733.
11. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
12. Id. at 519–24. Congress responded by adopting the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1003, 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–45 (2006).
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interpretation of the legislation that Hamdi provoked.13 Finally,
in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court struck down as unconstitutional
portions of the legislation that Hamdan incited.14 These cases
established a fundamental right of at least some detainees held
outside the mainland United States to obtain judicial review of
their detention. New legislation adopted at the beginning of the
Obama administration implemented these requirements.15
The complex interactions of legislative enactments and
judicial review that already had unfolded by the time that
President Obama took office had a somewhat surprising and
perverse consequence for the new administration. Although the
president promised to shut down Guantanamo within a year and
to move the most dangerous detainees to the United States, a
goal that the Bush administration also pursued in its second
term, he encountered bipartisan opposition in Congress.16
Political pressure also forced the Justice Department to climb
down from its announced intention to try Khalid Sheik
Mohammed, the accused mastermind of the 9/11 attack, in a
civilian court in New York. However odious Guantanamo and
military tribunals remain in the eyes of the rest of the world, the
Obama administration found itself stuck with them.
There are many reasons not to like the current detention
regime and to seek alternatives. From the point of view of the
government, judicial oversight consumes time, attention, and
material resources and distracts from the search for better
policy. From the point of view of detainees, the procedural
rights developed by the Supreme Court and implemented by
Congress seem toothless. Although the government has released
a few dozen detainees under the pressure of litigation and a
handful of district courts have ordered the release of others, the
government has not lost a single appeal on the merits.17 One
13. 548 U.S. at 590–612. Congress responded by adopting the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
14. 553 U.S. at 732.
15. Military Commissions Act of 2009, enacted by National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801–07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–2614
(2009).
16. Id. § 1041, 123 Stat. 2454–55 (barring the use of funds to transfer
Guantanamo detainees to the United States).
17. See Latif v. Obama, No. 10-5319, 2011 WL 5431524 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011);
Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir.
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cannot look at the system without recalling William Stuntz’s
profound critique of constitutional criminal procedure, which,
he persuasively argued, distracts from the pursuit of substantive
justice without providing accused persons commensurate
offsetting benefits.18 We seem to have arrived at the worst of all
possible worlds, with litigation distracting the government from
developing better criteria to distinguish the dangerous from the
simply wayward without any evidence that the courts can make
this distinction themselves.
Nor do military tribunals seem an ideal approach for
punishing foreign nationals captured abroad. From the
perspective of the accused, they smack of arbitrary justice. From
the perspective of the government, they provoke international
criticism while not providing the prosecution any greater speed,
flexibility, or protection of secret intelligence than do regular
criminal trials. Proponents of military tribunals, especially those
in Congress today, picture them as superior to civilian trials, but
the supporting evidence for this view is scant.
Yet, at the end of the day, the Guantánamo-and-militarytribunals solution prevailed. One reason is that, over the course
of the Hamdi-Hamdan-Boumediene trilogy and the corresponding
legislative responses, the status quo became entrenched. The
courts endorsed the basic structure of indefinite detention and
tribunals, just with a bit more judicial supervision than the Bush
administration had wanted. Congress filled in the details
through three successive enactments. The status quo, however
unpalatable, rests on legislative approval backed up by judicial
guidance. Anything else is a step into the unknown.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION OUTSIDE THE TERRORISM
CONTEXT
Issues involving national security and terrorism have taken
up much of the attention of the human rights community and
2011); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642
F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Uthman
v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d
1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
18. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
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the government. In the background, however, human rights
litigation lumbers along. The executive branch seldom
intervenes directly in these suits, and even more rarely urges a
court to support a plaintiff’s claim.19 In one case, the Obama
administration intervened on the side of plaintiffs, albeit on the
question of immunity rather than the merits.20 Its position, while
not inconsistent with that of the Bush administration, hints at a
slightly wider window for civil suits based on human rights
claims.
The issue involves the scope of immunity from civil suits
available to foreign officials. For roughly two decades, the
executive had consistently argued that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”), which applies to a “legal person,”
does not address this question. In 1990 the Ninth Circuit
disagreed.21 Several circuits followed the Ninth in trying to
shoehorn claims against individuals into the FSIA, but the
Fourth Circuit finally broke ranks in 2009.22 The case involved
human rights claims brought by Somali nationals against one of
the leaders of the government that had ruled that country in the
1980s.23 The Fourth Circuit held that FSIA had no bearing on
the official’s susceptibility to suit and left open the question of
whether he enjoyed any nonstatutory immunity.24
Before the Supreme Court, the Obama administration
submitted an amicus brief that both defended its interpretation
of the FSIA and explained its understanding of non-statutory
immunity of foreign officials.25 It argued that the executive had
19. The principal exceptions to the statement that the government rarely urges
support for plaintiffs are the two most important Alien Tort Statute court of appeals
decisions. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadiƒ v. Karadñiƒ, 70
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
20. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Samantar
v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555), 2010 WL 342031 [hereinafter Brief of
the United States in Samantar].
21. Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
22. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009). Decisions that had followed
Chuidian included In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.
2008); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380 (5th
Cir. 1999); Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
23. Id. at 373–75 (describing the plaintiff’s allegations of “torture and other
abuses in violation of international law”).
24. Id. at 383–84.
25. Brief of the United States in Samantar, supra note 20.
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unreviewable authority to determine whether a foreign official
should enjoy immunity from civil suit.26 In remarkably guarded
language, the Obama administration stated:
[I]n this case, the Executive may also find the nature of the
acts alleged—and whether they should properly be
regarded as actions in an official capacity—to be relevant to
the immunity determination. Respondents have not only
relied on the [Alien Tort Statute] to assert a federal
common law cause of action, but have also invoked the
statutory right of action in the [Torture Victims Protection
Act] for damages based on torture and extrajudicial killing.
And respondents, some of whom are United States citizens,
have brought that action against a former Somali official
who now lives in the United States, not Somalia.27

The government thus hinted, although without any
commitment, that it might not recognize the immunity rule for
officials accused of grave human rights abuses.
This suggestion seemed to represent a break from the
recent past. The Bush administration had filed an amicus brief
in Matar v. Dichter,28 a civil suit against an Israeli official accused
of Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims Protection Act
violations.29 That suit alleged that the defendant had committed
grave war crimes and engaged in extrajudicial killing when,
acting as head of Israel’s Shin Bet security agency, he authorized
missile attacks on terrorists.30 There the United States argued
that the willingness of the Israeli government to take
responsibility for these actions disposed of the immunity issue.31
In particular, it noted that, “the Executive does not recognize
any exception to a foreign official’s immunity for civil suits
alleging jus cogens violations.”32 The Samantar brief, by contrast,
at least left open the possibility that immunity might not apply in
cases of grave human rights abuses.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Dichter,
Matar].
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 25.
563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Matar v.
563 F.3d 9 (2009) (No. 07-2579-cv) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in
See Matar, 563 F.3d at 10–11.
See Brief for the United States in Matar, supra note 29, at 5.
Id.
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In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court unanimously
agreed with the government that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”) did not apply to government officials.
It left the question of non-statutory immunity to the lower courts
to decide, although language in the opinion suggests the
Court’s disposition to embrace this concept.33 On remand, the
Justice Department submitted a statement of interest to the trial
court asserting that Samantar should not enjoy immunity.34 The
government referred in passing to the language quoted above.35
It based its determination regarding Samantar, however, on only
two factors, namely the absence of a recognized government of
Somalia and the fact of the defendant's prolonged presence in
the United States.36 Because immunity belonged to the state, not
the official, the absence of a recognized state with the capacity
to assert or waive immunity mitigated against recognition of
immunity here. In addition, Samantar’s long-term residence in
the United States bolstered the US’s “right to exercise
jurisdiction over its residents.”37 The district court quickly
embraced the government’s position. 38
The space between the Bush administration's position in
Matar and the Obama administration's in Samantar is slight and
subtle. The first categorically rejected any exception to
immunity for grave human rights abuses. The latter hinted that
the nature of the abuse might play a role in making the
immunity determination, but made no definite commitment.
The actual determination of the Obama administration rested
on principles that essentially apply only to one set of persons,
namely all former Somali officials who become long-term
residents of the United States. It thus leaves open the imposition
of immunity in suits such as that brought against Dichter.
33. 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292–93 (2010).
34. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Yousuf v. Samantar,
No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011).
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 9.
38. See Order, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA) (E.D. Va. Feb. 15,
2011). The order does not make clear whether the court reached this result because it
regarded the government’s determination as binding, or instead because it agreed with
the government’s arguments. For criticism of the government’s position, see Ingrid
Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State
Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2011).

502 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:488
It seems unlikely that positions taken in human rights
litigation would have much salience in the next election, unless
perhaps the executive supported a lawsuit against Israel or one
of its top officials. Nor do these issues present the same degree
of fraught uncertainty that terrorism and detention do. Rather,
the failure of the Obama administration to make a clean break
with the Bush administration on questions of human rights
litigation can be attributed more to the conservative influence of
the permanent bureaucracy.
Once lawyers from the Departments of Justice and State
take a position before the courts, they, to a certain extent, lock
in their successors. While it is not unheard of for lawyers from
one administration to repudiate positions taken in prior judicial
filings, such reversals come at a considerable cost.39 Government
lawyers know that disavowing the work of their predecessors
generally undermines the credibility of the government’s legal
representatives with the courts. This credibility is a valuable
resource, especially to the senior career lawyers who will likely
continue to appear before the courts even after their current
political masters leave office. For all the reasons discussed above,
they will push back at efforts by a new administration to change.
The Vienna Convention episode also illustrates the limits
on an administration’s willingness to spend political capital on
human rights issues. Here the human rights claim arose as a
defense against a criminal prosecution, rather than as the basis
for a tort suit.40 As followers of the controversy know, the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations obligates a state to notify a
citizen of another signatory state of his or her right to contact a
consular official after an arrest on criminal charges.41 The
Convention’s Optional Protocol, to which the United States is a

39. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1448 (2010) (discussing the institutional stability of the executive’s legal
positions).
40. The dispute over the application of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations in criminal trials entailed not less than six decisions of the Supreme Court:
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Federal Republic of Germany v. United States,
526 U.S. 111 (1999); Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Medellín v.
Texas, 554 U.S. 759 (2008).
41. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
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party, provides for International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
adjudication of disputes regarding the Convention.42 In Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals,43 the ICJ ruled that these treaties
obligated the United States to afford a hearing to foreign
nationals sentenced to death in state criminal proceedings to
determine whether they had suffered prejudice from a denial of
their right to consular notification. In particular, the ICJ ruled
that the obligation to provide this hearing existed even if the
foreign national had forfeited his right to a hearing under state
law by not raising the consular notification issue in a timely
fashion.44
The Texas courts refused to comply with the Avena decision
on the ground that the ICJ lacked the power to override the
state’s laws on the proper procedures for postconviction review
of a sentence.45 The Bush administration intervened in the
spring of 2005. While it continued to adhere to the position first
adopted by the Clinton administration that orders of the ICJ
regarding the Vienna Convention did not have any direct effect
in US domestic law, and therefore did not bind the states, it
posited that the president had the authority under the various
treaties and implementing legislation to issue an order binding
on the states to implement an ICJ decision. Accordingly,
President Bush required Texas to provide the hearing that the
ICJ had demanded. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled
that the president lacked the constitutional authority to make
this order and the Supreme Court agreed.46 Texas then

42. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
43. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 4).
44. For more on the dispute, and in particular the issue of procedural default, see
Paul B. Stephan, Rethinking the International Rule of Law: The Homogeneity Fallacy and
International Law’s Threat to Itself, 3 JERUSALEM REV. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming Dec.
2011).
45. Ex parte Medellín, No. WR-50, 191-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2001) (not
designated for publication).
46 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), aff’g Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I took part
in the preparation of the amicus brief of the United States defending the president’s
order before the Supreme Court. I also submitted an amicus brief in the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals arguing that the International Court of Justice decision did not
have direct effect in US law. In an earlier iteration of the case Medellín v. Dretke, 544
U.S. 660 (2005), I filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court both noting a
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proceeded to execute the first of several persons covered by the
ICJ order after the Supreme Court refused to stay the
proceeding.47
The incoming Obama administration knew that the conflict
between the ICJ and the United States remained an ongoing
problem because other Mexican nationals covered by the ICJ
order still awaited execution in Texas. Undoubtedly distracted
by the economic crisis and the battle over health care, the
administration largely did nothing. In particular, it did not seek
from Congress the legislative authority to implement the ICJ
order, even though the Supreme Court had made clear that this
action was necessary and during the 111th Congress the
president’s party enjoyed strong majorities in both Houses.48
The inevitable conflict arose in July 2011, when Humberto
Leal Garcia, another of the Mexican nationals covered by the
Avena decision, faced execution in Texas. Leal petitioned the
Supreme Court for a stay. He argued, inter alia, that a bill just
introduced in the Senate would create the prerequisite authority
for honoring the ICJ mandate. The Obama administration, in
an amicus brief in support of Leal, embraced this argument.49
The Supreme Court, however, refused to delay the execution.50
Its per curiam opinion, to which five Justices joined, questioned
as a general matter the propriety of staying an otherwise
authorized proceeding because of pending legislation, and then
noted the lack of any evidence that congressional action on the
bill was imminent.
This episode illustrates not only the separation-of-powers
limits on what an administration can do but also the significance
of political constraints. Because of the constitutional distribution
of powers, the president cannot intervene on behalf of the
jurisdictional defect in the appeal of a denial of federal habeas and arguing that ICJ
decisions do not have direct effect in US law.
47 Medellín v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759 (2008).
48 For criticism of this inaction by a Bush administration lawyer who had played a
central role in the Medellín case, see John B. Bellinger, An International Treaty Congress
Should Support, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030304316.html.
49 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Applications for a
Stay, Leal v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (Nos. 11-5001 (11A1), 11-5002 (11A2), 115081 (11A21)), 2011 WL 2630156.
50. Leal v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011).
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United States in a state criminal proceeding, even if he has
international law on his side. Political constraints, in particular
the unpopularity of capital murderers and the lack of general
sympathy for the ICJ among the American people, meant that
neither administration spent political capital to induce Congress
to do the right thing. The Bush administration tried to go
around Congress; the Obama administration limited itself to
what it surely knew was a quixotic gesture, in the form of an illfated amicus brief.
VI. TERRORISM OUTSIDE OF CAPTURE AND DETENTION:
THE CASE OF THE PMOI
A final illustration of continuity in policy between the Bush
and Obama administrations is the treatment of the People's
Mojahedin of Iran (“PMOI”).51 This group fought against the
Shah of Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, and in the course of that
struggle had attributed to it the assassination of both Iranian
and US officials. After the Shah’s fall, it lost a bloody power
struggle with the mullahs, resulting in the death of tens of
thousands of its adherents. Most of its leadership fled to France,
which later expelled them. They then ended up in Iraq, where
they fought on the Iraqi side in its war with Iran. After that
conflict ended in 1988, the PMOI conducted what it termed
“military operations,” and what the Iranians considered
“terrorist attacks,” on Iranian territory.
US efforts to attack terrorist organizations at the point of
their financial base originated in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.52 This regime, updated several times
since, authorizes the secretary of state to designate persons or
groups as terrorist. The designation triggers criminal
prohibitions on the provision of support. The European Union
(“EU”) followed the US model with its own regime after 9/11.53
51. My account of the dispute in text is based on my brief in the case. Brief Amici
Curiae of the Honorable Alejo Vidal-Quadras, M.E.P. (Spain) et al. in Support of
Petitioner, People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 227–30
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1059), 2009 WL 6084593.
52. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
302(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006)).
53. Council Common Position of 27 Dec. 2001 on the Application of Specific
Measures to Combat Terrorism No. 2001/931/CFSP, arts. 2–3, 2001 O.J. L 344/93.
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Working within the new statutory framework, the United States
designated the PMOI as terrorist in 1997.54 The EU did so in
2002.
The US invasion of Iraq radically changed the PMOI's
circumstances. The PMOI already had renounced all armed
activity in 2001. Once the coalition forces arrived in Iraq, it
sought to cooperate closely with them. The coalition forces
disarmed the group completely and generally credited it with
providing useful intelligence and support. Supporters in Europe
launched a campaign to remove the group from the list of
terrorist organizations, an effort that bore fruit in 2009.55
In the United States, however, both the Bush and Obama
administrations resisted all efforts to reclassify the organization.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice renewed the terrorist
designation shortly before leaving office in 2009 and the Obama
administration stoutly defended the decision in court.56 As of
this writing, the group remains on the terrorist list.
For the PMOI, the practical consequences of the US
designation are at least as significant as the legal ramifications.
Several thousand core members have been confined to Camp
Ashraf, an installation inside Iraq, since the 2003 invasion. The
Shia-oriented Maliki government, since having taken office, has
sought to improve ties with Iran; some would say it has tried to
bring Iraq firmly into the Iranian camp. The Iranian
government remains deeply hostile to the PMOI, partly because
of the power struggle in 1980, partly because of its fighting on
the Iraqi side during the war, and partly because of the
intermittent attacks on Iranian targets carried out by the
organization up to 2001. Accordingly, the Maliki government
has at least tolerated, and perhaps organized, several violent
incidents in Camp Ashraf resulting in dozens of deaths and has
threatened to hand over the remaining PMOI adherents to Iran.
54. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MUJAHEDIN-E
KHALQ CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 1 (2009).
55. Council Decision No. 2009/62/EC (implementing Art. 2(3) of Regulation
(EC) No. 2580/200), 2009 O.J. L 23/25.
56. The following year the court ruled that the secretary had failed to provide a
legally sufficient justification for her ruling and ordered her to reconsider the decision.
People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 613 F.3d 220, 227–30 (D.C. Cir.
2010). The designation as a terrorist organization remains in place pending the
secretary’s review, however.
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As the predicament of the group worsens, efforts have begun to
organize the relocation of PMOI survivors to various points in
Europe and the Middle East. But because the group remains on
the US list of terrorist organizations, potential host countries
have balked at providing asylum.
US law requires that a group present a current threat of
terrorist acts for it to remain on the list, and the secretary of
state in other cases has credited renunciations of past behavior
by former terrorists. The secretary’s reluctance to accept that
the PMOI has lost both its capacity to launch terrorist attacks
and the motivation to do so flies in the face of considerable
evidence that the organization has changed with the times. It is
hard to avoid the conclusion that factors other than the
existence of a genuine terrorist threat explain the PMOI’s
continued presence on the terrorist organizations list.
The original designation of the PMOI in 1997 took place in
the context of the Clinton administration’s pursuit of a thaw in
relations with Iran. The Bush administration reversed this
conciliatory course, especially in the wake of the 9/11 attack. Its
anti-Iranian position became even more strident after the
exposure of Iran’s nuclear program in 2002. Yet the designation
of the PMOI as a terrorist organization continued. Alongside the
public confrontation between the United States and the Iranian
regime, there proceeded quiet efforts to explore ways of easing
tensions. These efforts survived the 2005 election of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a conspicuously unpalatable populist, as
president. In turn, candidate Obama pledged to improve US
relations with Iran, a point he repeated in his inaugural address.
In sum, the backdrop to the PMOI’s designation as a terrorist
organization included the government’s desire to improve
relations with a government that detests the PMOI, and the US
executive’s anxiety about the Iranian regime’s ability to harm
US interests, especially after the Iraq invasion and the violent
disorder that followed. It is plausible, although by no means
proven, that the PMOI’s terrorist designation remains because
Iran regards the PMOI as obnoxious, and not because the US
government believes the organization is terrorist.
From a human rights perspective, how should one feel
about such realpolitik? First, designating a group as terrorist
significantly affects important human rights, such engaging in
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political activity, owning property, and contracting for goods
and services. US courts recognize that the government must
satisfy constitutional safeguards of due process in conferring the
designation, and the European Court of Justice came to a
similar conclusion under general European human rights law.57
The issue raised by the PMOI case is not so much
procedural as it is substantive: does an exaggeration of a security
threat to satisfy a foreign relations interest infringe human
rights? One would think that arbitrary infringements on liberty,
even if achieved only after a full hearing, would transgress the
nation’s core values. May a state silence a group and seize its
assets simply to please another state?
One can imagine the arguments for either side of this
debate. A pragmatist might assert that foreign policy interests
can accumulate to the point where a real national security
problem arises, and that human rights must give way to the
fundamental necessity of self-preservation. Appeasing Iran
might have a chance of diminishing its nuclear threat as well as
easing the exit of the United States from Iraq. An idealist might
argue that human rights values go to the core of our national
identity and that sacrificing those values for a hypothetical
security threat is indefensible. We should not hold hostage the
hapless residents of Camp Ashraf to please Iran, the idealist
might say, any more than we should allow Iran to seize hostages
for its own debased ends.
One would have thought that this debate might capture,
however crudely, what distinguishes the Bush administration,
elevating national security, from candidate Obama, defending
human rights. Yet, the proof is in the pudding. In the case of the
PMOI, both administrations have struck the same balance. It is
hard not to see the hand of the permanent bureaucracy at work
here, resisting whatever visions of human rights that the new
folks in town might have brought with them. As a result,
President Obama seems guilty of the sins that candidate Obama
so eloquently decried.

57. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–09
(D.C. Cir. 2001); C-402/05 & C-415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l
Found. v. Council, Joined Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351.
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The PMOI episode also illustrates the difficulty of
challenging security assessments once they have been made.
Although new facts exist, their relevance to national security is
hard to judge because of the generally murky, and yet highly
salient, nature of security threats. One can hardly take an
organization at its word that it has abandoned terrorism. Present
incapacity to launch attacks, however well-supported by
evidence, may not translate into future benevolence, as one
cannot predict with certainty how a group might behave were it
to regain its capacity for attacks. Accordingly, bureaucratic
inertia prevails.
CONCLUSION
In 2009, supporters of candidate Obama believed that he
would end Bush administration human rights policies that
brought shame upon the nation and opprobrium from around
the world. Opponents believed that his naïveté and
inexperience would lead to dangerous national security
blunders (“Who do you want answering the call at 3:00 am?”
asked candidate Clinton.). Both of these conjectures seem to
have been falsified by events. Both disregarded the deep
structural forces that make it difficult to change government
policy generally and national security policy in particular.
The burden of my argument is not that change never
comes to Washington. The country that awoke on the morning
of September 12, 2001, was profoundly different from that of
the previous day, and nowhere was this truer than in
Washington. Rather, the point is that change comes from
outside forces, mostly unanticipated. How an administration
responds to such challenges reveals much about its nature and
capabilities, but political campaigns rarely help us to anticipate
those qualities.
Happily for the nation, no great shocks to the system have
erupted since the start of the Obama administration. In the
absence of such trauma, one should anticipate continuity, not
change. And this is what we have seen.

